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INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie*
RENEWAL OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY
In Ray v. Associated Indemnity Corporation,' the insurer con-
tended in a motion for summary judgment that the company had
mailed the insured a premium notice for the renewal of automobile
liability insurance, but the insurer never received payment from the
insured. Thus, the insurer asserted that its policy had expired with-
out renewal. The insured denied receipt of the premium notice.
Reversing the lower courts, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:636.1(E)2 requires "communication" by
the insurer to the insured of the company's willingness to renew.
The insured, upon his denying receipt of the premium notice, is en-
titled to an opportunity to disprove the insurer's prima facie
evidence of such communication.' When premiums are due on the re-
newal date, the policy will be renewed automatically under Revised
Statutes 22:636.1(E) whether or not the premium has been paid,
unless the insurer timely gives prior notice to the insured either of
an intent not to renew or of a willingness to renew.'
*Special Lecturer of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. 373 So. 2d 166 (La. 1979).
2. LA. R.S. 22:636.1(E) (Supp. 1968 & 1974) provides:
No insurer shall fail to renew a policy unless it shall mail or deliver to the named.
insured, at the address shown in the policy, at least twenty days advance notice
of its intention not to renew. This subsection shall not apply: (1) if the insurer has
manifested its willingness to renew; or (2) in case of nonpayment of premium ....
3. Apparently, the court was willing to apply, by analogy, the provision of LA.
R.S. 22:636.1(F), which states: "Proof of mailing of notice of cancellation, or of intention
not to renew or of reasons for cancellation, to the named insured at the address shown
in the policy, shall be sufficient proof of notice." However, the court has noted
previously that this provision only establishes a rebuttable presumption of notice. Cuc-
cia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 La. 545, 263 So. 2d 884 (1972).
4. The lower courts had found that LA. R.S. 22:636.1(E) did not require renewal
because the insurer had manifested its willingness to renew the policy and because of
the nonpayment of the premium. The supreme court found that, under the terms of
the policy, the renewal premium was due "on or before" the renewal date. Therefore,
the court concluded that the insurer was required to give notice of an intent not to
renew or of a willingness to renew automatically under R.S. 22:636.1(E) prior to the
time any premium was due. In addition, manifestation of intent to renew required com-
munication of such intent to the insured. Perhaps the court believed this rather strained
interpretation of LA. R.S. 22:636.1(E) was necessary to make certain that the insured
was aware of the renewal date.
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OBLIGATION TO DEFEND
Whether a liability insurer is obligated to defend an alleged in-
sured is determined by the allegations of the petition. Under the
leading case of American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki,5
the insurer is obligated to defend if, assuming the allegations of the
petition to be true, the policy would provide coverage for the alleged
insured. The obligation to defend exists even though the insurer
believes it can, and subsequently does, disprove the plaintiffs
allegations.' Several recent decisions7 emphasize, however, that the
obligation is determined by the factual allegations of the petition
and not by the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader.8 Thus, even
though a petition may contend that the liability of the defendant is
covered under a certain policy, the alleged insurer is not obligated
to defend if its policy provides no coverage for the cause of action
described in the factual allegations of the petition.
For example, in Michel v. Ryan,' the petition alleged an accident
which occurred after the expiration of the insurer's policy. Although
the petition asserted that the insurer provided coverage for the acci-
dent, the court held that the insurer was not obligated to defend
because certain alleged facts-the date and circumstances of the ac-
cident-clearly excluded the possibility of coverage under the pol-
icy. Similarly, the insurer in Richards v. Farmers Export Company10
was allowed to escape any defense obligation by establishing, con-
trary to the conclusions drawn in the petition, that the alleged in-
sured was not an executive officer within the definition of the
policy.
Another decision, Guidry v. Zeringue," appears inconsistent
5. 255 La. 251, 230 So. 2d 253 (1969).
6. Generally the insurer's obligation to defend suits against its insured is broader
than its liability for damage claims. And the insurer's duty to defend suits
brought against its insured is determined by the allegations of the injured plain-
tiffs petition, with the insurer being obligated to furnish a defense unless the
petition unambiguously excludes coverage.
255 La. at 269, 230 So. 2d at 259.
7. Guidry v. Zeringue, 379 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Richards v.
Farmers Export Co., 377 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Michel v. Ryan, 373 So. 2d
985 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied 376 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979). Cf. Applewhite v. City of
Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (factual allegations did not exclude
possibility of coverage).
8. These holdings are consistent with the result reached by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Jackson v. Lajaunie, 264 La. 181, 270 So. 2d 859 (1972). See also Mut
v. Newark Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
9. 373 So. 2d 985 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
10. 377 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
11. 379 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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with the Czarniecki rule that the insurer must defend unless the
petition "unambiguously" excludes coverage. In Guidry the insured
purchased coverage for his 1972 Buick but not for his 1975 pickup.
The petition alleged that the insurer provided liability coverage for
the pickup as a "temporary substitute automobile" for the Buick.
Although the contention that the pickup was a "temporary
substitute automobile" was a conclusion, the factual allegations of
the petition did not "unambiguously" exclude that possibility.12 The
Guidry court allowed the insurer to disprove this "conclusion" and
thus to avoid the obligation to defend. Under Czarniecki, the insurer
would be obligated to defend. On the other hand, Guidry illustrates
the need for a more equitable rule that would not force the insurer
to defend an action when coverage in fact does not exist merely
because of the affirmative or ambiguous allegations of the plaintiff,
a stranger to the contractual relationship created by issuance of the
policy.13
12. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bertrand, 306 So. 2d 426 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1975).
13. The burden of defending an alleged "insured" ultimately found to have no
coverage is made particularly onerous by Opinion 342 of the Louisiana State Bar
Association Committee on Professional Responsibility; that opinion requires the in-
surer to employ separate counsel for itself and the alleged insured if the insurer in-
tends to, or reserves the right to, assert a coverage defense.
1981]
